[[PART 2]]
i just don't
know what all the fuss is over
this one little
feed lot, that has not complied
with the Aug.
4, 1997 'partial' feed ban.
"Sources
who spoke on condition of anonymity identified the feedlot as
Vaqueros of
Texas Cattle Feeders in Floresville, 28 miles southeast of
San Antonio."
Subject:
U.S.A. GBR should be revised to risk # 3 (please read)
Date:
Thu, 18 Jan 2001 09:51:16 -0800
From:
"Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder@wt.net>
To:
civis@europarl.eu.int, public.info@consilium.eu.int,
sgf-info@cec.eu.int,
sanco-helpline@cec.eu.int,
env-assess@cec.eu.int, kabinett-fischler@cec.eu.int,
eijudo@sepia.ocn.ne.jp,
deal@airtime.co.uk,
m_yoneda@neuro.med.kyushu-u.ac.jp, stauber@compuserve.com,
ljdumble@connexus.net.au,
n.mclennan@ed.ac.uk, Harash@compuserve.com
Greetings to all EU Countries,
I wish to send
this info to you, to use as you wish.
PLEASE, take
heed, and stop the spread of human TSEs.
thank you,
respectfully,
Terry S. Singeltary
Sr.,
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas
USA 77518
Subject: Report
on the assessment of the Georgraphical BSE-risk of the
USA July 2000
(not good)
Date: Wed,
17 Jan 2001 21:23:51 -0800
From:
"Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <flounder@wt.net>
Reply-To:
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de>
To:
BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de
#########
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy <BSE-L@UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE>
#########
Greetings List Members and ALL EU Countries,
Because of
this report, and the recent findings
of the 50-state
BSE Conference call, I respectfully
seriously
suggest that these Countries and the SSC
re-evaluate
the U.S.A. G.B.R. to a risk factor of #3.
I attempted
to post this to list in full text,
but would
not accept...
thank you,
kind regards,
Terry S. Singeltary
Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA
Report on the
assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA
July
2000
PART II
REPORT ON THE
ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE
RISK
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
- 29 -
Report on the
assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA
July
2000
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
OVERALL ASSESSMENT
The current
geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is II, i.e. it is unlikely
but cannot
be excluded that domestic cattle are (clinically or
pre-clinically)
infected with the BSE-agent.
Stability:
Before 1990 the system was extremely unstable because feeding
of MBM to
cattle happened, rendering was inappropriate with regard to
deactivation
of the BSE-agent and SRM and fallen stock were rendered for
feed. From
1990 to 1997 it improved to very unstable, thanks to efforts
undertaken
to trace imported animals and exclude them from the feed
chain and
intensive surveillance. In 1998 the system became neutrally
stable after
the RMBM-ban of 1997.
External challenges:
A moderate external challenge occurred in the
period before
1990 because of importation of live animals from
BSE-affected
countries, in particular from the UK and Ireland. It cannot
be excluded
that some BSE-infected animals have been imported by this
route and
did enter the US rendering and feed production system. The
efforts undertaken
since 1990 to trace back UK-imported cattle and to
exclude them
from the feed chain reduced the impact of the external
challenge
significantly.
Interaction
of external challenges and stability: While extremely
unstable,
the US system was exposed to a moderate external challenge,
mainly resulting
from cattle imports from the UK. It can not be excluded
that BSE-infectivity
entered the country by this route and has been
recycled to
domestic cattle. The resulting domestic cases would have
been processed
while the system was still very unstable or unstable and
would hence
have initiated a number of second or third generation cases.
However, the
level of the possible domestic prevalence must be below the
low detection
level of the surveillance in place.
As long as
there are no changes in stability or challenge the
probability
of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with
the BSE-agent
will remain at the current level.
JUSTIFICATION
1. DATA
The available
information was suitable to carry out the GBR risk
assessment.
- 30 -
Report on the
assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA
July
2000
2. STABILITY
2.1
Overall appreciation of the ability to identify BSE-cases and to
eliminate
animals at risk of being infected before they are processed
·
Before 1989, the ability of the system to identify (and
eliminate)
BSE cases was limited.
·
Since 1990 this ability is significantly improved, thanks to a
good BSE-surveillance
and culling system (contingency plan).
·
Today the surveillance should be able to detect clinical
BSE-cases
within the limits set by an essential passive surveillance
system, i.e.
some cases might remain undetected.
2.2
Overall appreciation of the ability to avoid recycling
BSE-infectivity,
should it enter processing
·
Before 1997 the US rendering and feed producing system would not
have been
able to avoid recycling of the BSE agent to any measurable
extent. If
the BSE-agent was introduced the feed chain, it could
probably have
reached cattle.
·
After the introduction of the RMBM-to-ruminants-ban in August
1997 the ability
of the system to avoid recycling of BSE-infectivity was
somewhat increased.
It is still rather low due to the rendering system
of ruminant
material (including SRM and fallen stock) and the persisting
potential
for cross-contamination of cattle feed with other feeds and
hence RMBM.
2.3 Overall assessment of the Stability
·
Until 1990 the US BSE/cattle system was extremely unstable as
RMBM was commonly
fed to cattle, the rendering system was not able to
reduce BSE-infectivity
and SRM were rendered. This means that incoming
BSE infectivity
would have been most probably recycled to cattle and
amplified
and the disease propagated.
·
Between 1990 and 1995 improvements in the BSE surveillance and
the efforts
to trace back and remove imported cattle gradually improved
the stability
but
the system
remained very unstable.
In 1998 the
system became unstable because of an RMBM-ban introduced in
1997. After
1998 the ban was fully implemented and the system is
regarded to
be neutrally stable since 1998. The US system is therefore
seen to neither
be able to amplify nor to reduce circulating or incoming
BSE-infectivity.
3. CHALLENGES
A moderate
external challenge occurred in the period 1980-1989 because
of importation
of live animals from the UK. imports from other countries
are regarded
to have been negligible challenges.
·
As a consequence of this external challenge, infectivity could
have entered
the feed cycle and domestic animals could have been exposed
to the agent.
These domestic BSE-incubating animals might have again
entered processing,
leading to an internal challenge since 1991.
·
This internal challenge could have produced domestic cases of
BSE, yet prevalence
levels could have been below the detection limits of
the surveillance
system until now. (According to US calculations, the
current surveillance
-31 -
Report on the
assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA July
2000
system could
detect clinical incidence of 1-3 cases per year per million
adult cattle,
i.e. in absolute numbers 43-129 cases per year). Between
1990 und 1995,
with the exclusion of the imported animals from Europe
from the feed
chain, the effect of the external challenges decreased.
4. CONCLUSION ON THE RESULTING RISKS
4.1 Interaction of stability and challenqe
·
In the late 80s, early 90s a moderate external challenges met an
extremely
unstable system. This would have amplified the incoming
BSE-infectivity
and propagated the disease.
·
With the exclusion of the imported animals from Europe from the
feed chain
between 1990 and 1995 the effect of the external challenge
decreased.
·
Before 1998 an internal challenge, if it developed, would have
met a still
unstable system (inappropriate rendering, no SRM ban, RMBM
ban only after
1997) and the BSE-infectivity could have been recycled
and amplified.
·
After 1998 the neutrally stable system could still recycle the
BSE-agent
but due to the RMBM-ban of 1997 the BSE-infectivity
circulating
in the system would probably not be amplified.
4.2 Risk that BSE-infectivity enters processing
·
A very low processing risk developed in the late 80s when the
UK-imports
were slaughtered or died. It increased until 1990 because of
the higher
risk to be infected with BSE of cattle imported from the UK
in 1988/89,
as these animals could have been processed prior to the
back-tracing
of the UK-imports in 1990.
·
From 1990 to 1995 a combination of surviving non-traced UK
imports and
some domestic (pre-)clinical cases could have arrived at
processing
resulting in an assumed constant low but non-negligible
processing
risk.
·
After 1995 any processing risk relates to assumed domestic cases
arriving at
processing.
·
The fact that no domestic cases have been shown-up in the
BSE-surveillance
is reassuring - it indicates that BSE is in fact not
present in
the country at levels above the detection limits of the
country's
surveillance system. This detection level has been calculated
according
to US-experts to be between 1 & 3 clinical cases per million
adult cattle
per year.
Note: The high
turnover in parts of the dairy cattle population with a
young age
at slaughter makes it unlikely that fully developed clinical
cases would
occur (and could be detected) or enter processing. However,
the theoretical
infective load of the pre-clinical BSE-cases that
under this
scenario could be processed, can be assumed to remain
relatively
low.
4.3 Risk that BSE-infectivity is recycled and propagated
·
During the period covered by this assessment (1980-1999) the
US-system
was not able to prevent propagation of BSE should it have
entered, even
if this ability was significantly improved with the
MBM-ban of
1997.
·
However, since the likelihood that BSE-infectivity entered the
system is
regarded to be small but on-negligible, the risk that
propagation
of the disease
took place
is also small but not negligible.
- 32 -
Report on the
assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA
July
2000
5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK
5.1 The current GBR
The current
geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is II, i.e. it is unlikely
but cannot
be excluded that domestic cattle are (clinically or
pre-clinically)
infected with the BSE-agent.
5.2 The expected development of the GBR
As long as
there are no changes in stability or challenge the
probability
of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with
the BSE-agent
remains at the current level.
5.3 Recommendations for influencin.q the future GBR
·
As long as the stability of the US system is not significantly
enbanced above
neutral levels it remains critically important to avoid
any new external
challenges.
·
All measures that would improve the stability of the system, in
particular
with regard to its ability to avoid recycling of the
BSE-agent
should it be present in the cattle population, would reduce,
over time,
the probability that cattle could be infected with the
BSE-agent.
Possible actions include:
removal of
SRMs and/or fallen stock from rendering, better rendering
processes,
improved compliance with the MBM-ban including control and
reduction
of cross-contamination.
·
Results from an improved intensive surveillance programme,
targeting
at risk sub-populations such as adult cattle in fallen stock
or in emergency
slaughter, could verify the current assessment.
snip...
FULL TEXT about
16 pages
http://www.vegsource.com/talk/lyman/messages/8278.html
http://www.vegsource.com/talk/lyman/messages/8279.html
http://www.vegsource.com/talk/lyman/index.html
TSS
############
http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html
############
Subject: BSE
50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL thread from BSE List and FDA
Posting
of cut version...
http://www.vegsource.com/talk/lyman/messages/8219.html
http://www.vegsource.com/talk/lyman/messages/8220.html
http://www.vegsource.com/talk/lyman/messages/8221.html
http://www.vegsource.com/talk/lyman/messages/8222.html
http://www.vegsource.com/talk/lyman/messages/8230.html
Moms death
from hvCJD
http://www.vegsource.com/talk/lyman/messages/7252.html
'MOMS AUTOPSY
REPORT'
http://www.vegsource.com/talk/lyman/messages/7548.html
this message will self destruct in 10 seconds ;-)
Terry S. Singeltary
Sr.,
P.O. Box 42,
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
281-559-2671
OH AND BY THE WAY;